Print article

He says that even before "Wonderful Country" he had visited India. Boogie is very pleased with the robotic impression Tal Friedman imposed upon his figure. "Great satire," he says, "but of course I don't touch drugs." Far from the snakes at the Kirya, he can comfortably move around in leather slippers. Behind his outdated glasses, short sleeves, and un-tucked shirt, he looks like a Kibbutz secretary. Moshe Yaalon is still a member of his kibbutz, Grofit. He comes on weekends, does shifts mostly in the cowshed. "What do you get out of it?" I ask. "Mostly milk," he replies. It's a nice morning for jokes. "You've made it, Boogie," twitter the birds on the windowsill. Yesterday the Vinograd Committee published its interim conclusions and the former Chief of Staff is mentioned in two minor lines. Only one small remark about inventory at the special units, and some anemic comments about his objection to transferring general staff responsibilities to the field forces. Nothing that would curdle the milk in your coffee. We sit in his office at the Shalem Center in the Moshava HaGermanit. Yaalon is senior faculty member there. It is pretty close to a house on Cremieux St., whose former owner has no reason to smile this morning. "Would you like to take a picture outside that house?" I suggest. Boogie declines with a slight smile.

He has no doubt that Peretz and Olmert must resign. Already at the end of the second week of battle, he thought that they should do so and take Dan Halutz with them on their way. This insight came to him after the 26th of July, when the Cabinet decided not to embark on a ground attack. "I identified a clear managerial problem," he says. It is a silly tragedy whose main actors were guilty of the sin of vanity. Primarily Boogie's successor, Dan Halutz. He who couldn't find the time to meet the former chief of staff who came back from Washington during the days of battle and wanted to contribute his insights. He who dominated the IDF's staff with "thought tyranny". Boogie doesn't like the behavior, nor the style. "This wouldn't have happened to me," he says in a low tone when I ask about Halutz's dealing with his stock portfolio that morning.

With Gabi Ashkenazi, not Dan Halutz, at the helm, would the war have looked different?

"I have no doubt it would have. Gabi would have held an open debate, no tyranny. I would advise Ashkenazi to be modest and not arrogant, dubious and not determinate – a professional officer and not one who behaves like a politician."

Will Boogie's full stomach bring him to the mass protest at Rabin Square? Boogie says he is keeping this to himself, "but my heart is with the protesters."

As for the report itself, he has only compliments. "It is precise, sharp, points at the most important issues." The most important things said, according to him, is at the end, and is more than military in character. "The committee's conclusion, that we are a society undergoing battle and we have to harness all our resources in facing it, is most important." He thinks the conclusions reinforce his claim about a military and political failure in the decision making process. "They point to a structural problem, but the problem is chiefly cultural. There is no culture allowing for open conversation between levels of hierarchy." The report also gives the impression, according to Boogie, that the government was a rubber stamp. "Functional problems of Cabinet members who do not understand the extent of responsibility."

But the committee also says that the policy of restraint and containment that you were one of its executors were large factors in allowing the Hizbullah to gain military strength.

"I was not a policy maker. In any case, notice that the committee does not criticize the Prime Minister for the policy of restraint. Everyone knows that restraint has its price."

You personally should be satisfied, your personal mentions are very minor.

"And yet I am frustrated. Not on the personal level, but on the national level."

In Homat Magen it worked

Our first meeting took place several hours before the report was published. Yaalon then said that when he would take the report in his hands, he would remember his friends who were casualties. Especially Shlomo Savirski who had been killed in a terrorist bombing of Kfar Ruppin and Dudi Kimmelfeld who had died during a chase in Jordan. He looked tense, but said he wasn't nervous. His closed expression didn't reveal a thing. I tried making jokes, but Boogie was no partner. I said that Avi Dichter told me they had once met in the middle of the night on enemy ground. Boogie replied that there are certain things he still cannot allow himself to discuss. So we spoke about the heavy issues, and in certain ways, I think, I was tougher than Vinograd.

You came back to the Army in the days of the Yom Kippur War conception. Were you, as chief of staff, not party to establishing another conception, that preferred the war against terror at the expense of the war on Hizbullah?

"The use of the word conception is simplistic. There is no such thing where there is no conception. Unlike the obliviousness after the Six Day War, I don't think I didn't refresh the scenarios. I was prepared for the scenario that ultimately happened in Lebanon. No one can take that from me. The intelligence had a correct assessment of the issue. I looked into all the operative plans."

Your statements, at least, reflect another position. One of Hizbullah missiles that had rusted, one that said there was no need for tanks in the Qasbah in Nablus, you gave a long departure interview to Ari Shavit at "Haaretz" and the word Lebanon was not mentioned once.

"Regarding the tanks, I said that if as an army we had to build a weapon to fight terror – it wouldn't look like a "Merkava" tank. This tank is not suitable for the alleys of Nablus. Its use there derived mainly from budget constraints. This reflects thinking that was correct. The whole world has come to learn what we have done to fight Palestinian terror."

And what about the rusted missiles?

"Here too, the exact quote was 'we are working under a policy that could very well make the missiles rust.' Meaning, we should engage in a policy that will bring them to rust, and this policy was active, not passive."

What was that policy? Moshe Yaalon came into office in the summer of 2002. "It was the peak time of the Hizbullah's provocations, they were taking advantage of our occupation with Homat Magen". He established, he says, a combined policy. "I said that in order to create deterrence, we would respond sharply to any provocation by the Hizbullah, and this indeed was fruitful. The Hizbullah was contained. They had casualties and stopped shooting anti-aircraft missiles. Here and there sharpshooters still shot around Metula."

And you do not mention their progress towards the fence.

"They were always on the fence. I as chief of staff came into office when they were on the fence. After we left Lebanon, they positioned themselves on the fence. It is Lebanese controlled territory and there were no understandings about the fence."

Here Yaalon names another two components of the combined policy. Ther realization that the Hizbullah was searching for international legitimacy sparked diplomatic activity on behalf of the Foreign office and the intelligence community. "Eventually, we managed to persuade the Western countries to define it as a terrorist organization." The third component: ignite an internal discussion in Lebanon regarding the legitimacy of an armed militia that is not controlled by the government. An internal movement led by Rafik Hariri raised the issue and gained momentum. More and more Lebanese organizations challenged the Syrians. Hundreds of thousands protested in the streets and they were kicked out of Lebanon. Upon completing his tenure, Yaalon said: Hizbullah is restrained, under pressure, and not carrying out any terrorist activity. "Because this was an educated, smart, and successful policy."

And its only disadvantage was that the in the IDF, during that time, not much was happening. There were tank operators who hadn't touched a tank in six years, or as Vinograd said, "in 2003 the reserve forces had no training at all." How responsible do you feel about the way the ground forces looked in the last war?

"I feel frustrated. What happened in the war shouldn't have happened. The same army, with the same budget, with the same level of drilling, should have finished the battle differently. I have the terrible feeling that if I were there, things would have been completely different."

With all modesty, may I ask why?

"Because I prepared the Army for this scenario. On the higher level, on the command level, in the division and in the unit level. As far as I am concerned, the Army was supposed to arrive prepared to this battle."

I still haven't understood what kind of preparation this was, when tank operators haven't touched their tanks for 6 years.

"When you go to war, you have to be aware of your capabilities and shortcomings, and there are always shortcomings. When the IDF is dependent in its reserves, there is no way the whole reserve population will be completely sharp. So you go through a move you initiate, even as a response to provocation. In these circumstances? Even if you've trained your reserve forces all year, and that didn’t happen in recent years, there is some rust meant to be there. You have to allow the recruited reserves to clean their rust.

How did it work in the past?

"Take Homat Magen as an example. There was a bombing at the Park Hotel. The regular units were called upon first and the reserves were given time to prepare. Whoever needed it got tank drills and came into action a bit later."

So what happened here? Carelessness? Recklessness? A light finger on the trigger?

"This happens when the political personnel meet with the military personnel and at the end of their meeting, decide to go to war, without realizing that this is what their decision entails. They agree on a response, without thinking of the political achievement to be obtained by the military action."

The debate, according to Boogie, was primarily emotional. "It was like you are angry and feel the need to kick the wall barefoot. A second before your foot hits the wall, you feel that you are going to hit a wall, and eventually it is very painful." With a Cabinet like this, we needed a chief of staff who would voice all opinions and concerns, but Halutz pushed them aside. "How did we embark upon the 'Grapes of Wrath' operation? I was head of intelligence then, and we did so only after scores of debates with the same cabinet. That was an army that knew what the political level wanted from it."

The meeting that never was

When the war broke, he was at a research facility in Washington. From the first days he identified the problems. He knew there was no air response to Katyushas, asked why no reserves were being recruited. It was clear to him that if the battle continued, ground action would be necessary. At the end of the first week, the Americans let him understand that Israel was asking for unlimited time. "A couple of weeks or a couple of months to crack down Hizbullah." I grabbed my head in my hands. What was happening? Who thinks that within weeks or months you can finish off the Hizbullah through air attacks?" Boogie conveyed messaged to the Chief of Staff through the Washington attaché Dan Harel. On July 23 he came to Israel. He immediate met with Gadi Shamni, Olmert's military secretary. He recommended immediate recruit of reserves, to create a military peak throughout the week and complete the battle on the weekend. The message was taken to Olmert. The following morning, he received a thank you call from the Prime Minister's office, "but there was currently no need for a meeting." He tried, in vain, to meet with the Chief of Staff. He promised him to be of service 24 hours a day. He said: "I have many insights, it's imperative we meet right away." If not a meeting, at least a wireless conversation on a safe phone. "We must meet," agreed Halutz politely, but nothing came of it. A week later, Boogie left the country without being heard by the Chief of Staff.

Why do you think he wouldn't meet you?

"My strong feeling was that there was a sense of arrogance that came from the success of the disengagement. These were the first days, and people thought that we were on our way to a huge victory. So why share the glory? You only delegate responsibility when things start going wrong. When that behavior starts emerging, you start skewering officers. You can fire an officer, but when it comes through the papers? When you put a knife in your officers' backs? Look what happened to Udi Adam."

So maybe the failure begins with personality. Just as Peretz didn't nominate a staff, the Vinograd hints, because of his vanity, so Halutz failed because of the arrogance you attribute to him?

"My feeling was rough even before Gilad Shalit was kidnapped. I received word from the army about conceptual tyranny. The officers were feeling: "we don't have to think, we just execute decisions, there's an agenda and that's it."

If they are the contracting executors, what is the Chief of Staff?

"The Chief of Staff of the IDF cannot be a chairman of the board. He must be the CEO. To go into detail, to read the material. It can't be that Shalit was kidnapped and a day later, the Chief of Staff tells the press that there were no warnings. The whole army knew there were warnings, only the Chief of Staff didn't know. So clearly, if the Chief of Staff doesn't read the material, doesn't talk to people, the whole muscle tone relaxes."

Could it be that Halutz didn't speak or consult because he understood you had left him a mediocre Staff?

"I never heard that complaint. It is the general staff. But I engaged in collaborative policy, not in the charismatic pose. The repression of expression makes people shut their mouths, makes the army irrelevant. This situation reminds me of Eli Zeira in the Yom Kippur War. It happens to highly capable people and you can't take that away from Halutz. He was a great commander of the Air Force, but there are jobs like Chief of Staff or Chief of Division where you can't be an expert at everything. So you must create a culture that says: "as a commander I can't know everything, you are the commander of the Nablus division, why don't you teach me about Nablus? So? Does this hurt your charisma? Your ability to manage?"

The rumors of war in the summer are premature

If the 12th of July had caught him in the Kirya, he would have been a manager: and recommended to react. He would have begun with air attacks, but also recruited reserves, prepare a ground force, but attempt to reach a political achievement by several days of air attacks. The question about this part war is relevant not only historically but also due to the realization that another war is possible. In an article called "The Second Lebanon War: from territory to ideology", Yaalon writes that the Hizbullah continues to receive long and short range missiles, that the tunnels and bunkers are working as if the summer of 2006 never happened. Is the next war really so close? According to Yaalon, Nasrallah has no interest in another war. He is busy with the internal issues in Lebanon, the struggle between the Hizbullah that wants to take over the country and make it an extension of Iran, and his adversaries.

What does it mean, the talk of possibility of war this summer?

"The rumors about the summer are caused because the Army must simply prepare a schedule for readiness, not because we think there's going to be war." Here of course Yaalon adds the required Middle Eastern caveat: "in the Middle East, you have to be prepared for anything. I wouldn't say unequivocally that nothing is ever going to happen."

The Vinograd report deals with the friction between the military and political echelons. The relationship between a Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff. In the past, Yaalon made the same complaint about his MOD, Shaul Mofaz, that Halutz made about Peretz. That the Minister does not bring his own alternatives to the table, but rather hears the military and presents it as his own opinion. "I don't care about the fact that a Minister presents something as his own opinion," says Boogie. "What really bothers me was that I didn't have a Minister of Defense and I'm not sure that here there was."

Shaul Mofaz was not a Minister of Defense?

"I call the Minister of Defense someone who thinks, goes deep into the issues, understands strategy. Not a general, not necessarily a military person. Rabin was a military person, but also a civilian Minister of Defense. Barak too, Arens, though he wan't a military person. When you come as a Chief of Staff to the MOD, you don't want him signing off on anything you do. You want a debate, even an educational debate."

With Mofaz there was no debate?

"No, of course not. You need someone who will bring the other aspects of defense. You need dialogue, where you speak in the military language and he speaks in the political language. In certain situations it was I who brought up the civilian issues. Sharon once told us: "why are you brining up the relations with the US?" We did, because no one else did. We did, because you can't go to war in the Mukata without taking into consideration the reaction of the US."

Shaul Mofaz is the person who met with COS Yaalon at en evening dedicated to the Engineering Corps and told him that his term wouldn't be extended for a fourth year. This was called the "dismissal." In pictures taken upon their exit, Boogie looks tightlipped, as if he swallowed a stick, but is determined not to vomit on that special evening. Mofaz doesn't look delighted either. His face has an icy smile. But it seems that in that conflict, there were no fatal strategic issues. Not even Yaalon's statement that the disengagement would give terror a second wind. Perhaps they simply didn't want him upstairs They always considered him a strange bird. A general with the soul of a dairy farmer and who spoke in philosophical terminology, using words like consciousness, thought, and culture. Read a lot. Perhaps too much. Independent, unpredictable, inflexible, even dogmatic and won't go with the flow. "I had principles that were inconvenient," he explained, "my main hobby was curiosity. I was always investigating and interrogating." Yaalon claims that the conflict about the disengagement was only an excuse. The real conflict was elsewhere. "I didn't think that people in Sharon's farm forum or the party should be involved in military appointments. I said 'over my dead body.' So there was my body." He claims he didn't ask for an extension, just asked whether yes or no. If they wanted him – he was prepared. If not – he would go home. In truth, he was pretty happy to go. "The night they told me I was through, I slept like I hadn't slept in months." For a long time, he walked around heavyhearted regarding the appointments. He had suspicions he couldn't prove. He warned the officers of whom he had suspicions of connections with politicians. "Halutz too?" I asked, "Anyone I needed to warn," he replied. He even considered resigning because of the intervention in appointments, but decided not to. "I would have resigned had it helped, but it would have looked like a putsch and I would have been slaughtered. So suddenly someone comes and relieves you of the burden. I was glad."

After this came the strategic advisors – spinologists, he calls them with contempt. They tried to label all of his comments with the label "a disgruntled former employee."

How big a part does the farm forum as a concept, I ask, play in the corruption in Israel? Boogie has no doubt about this. "The behavior in that period was bottom level." He refers to Anat Goren's film "All the Campaign's Men" and reminds me how all the Adlerists (named after Reuven Adler) were proud to reveal how they had run the country. They were once called secret consultants and no one knew their names. Gradually they were exposed. "I slowly saw them walking into discussion rooms, sitting along the walls," he describes, "until the decision making process no longer took place in the discussion room." One day he even discovered that the consultants were working completely independently, making decisions on their own. "They did this at the ranch instead of the Cabinet, instead of the head of the Shin Bet, the Head of the Mossad, the Chief of Staff."

Give me an example.

"The decision about the disengagement, for example, we weren't there. No Minister was there."

Then who? Adler? Omri?

"Yes. Weisglass too. The gang. This is the corruption. That's how the real decision making process in this country was ruined." But the outcomes of corruption also influenced him after leaving the Kirya. This year he deliberated whether to attend the President's Mansion for the Independence Day ceremonies. He finally decided to come honor the excelling soldiers. "And when I exited the gates, I saw a sign on the house across: "Rapists, Thieves, Corrupters – Happy holiday."

Can you blame whoever hung that sign?

"On the contrary. I identified with the sign. What keeps me up at night is the corruption. For over a decade I was at the junction where decisions were made. I could smell it. I could smell that things were not being done as they should."

Do you think that the suspicions regarding Olmert, Hirschson, Liberman, disqualify them from making decisions that affect human lives?

"There remains the question what is the moral validity of a corrupted leader to make a decision about human life. It is enough to hear the families who have lost their loved ones."

Some things will not let go

Beyond the rage on this tense day, Yaalon's life is quiet and more private. He can go to the cinema without scheduling it in advance with security, without reserving the seat in back for his protectors. He can run alone, swim alone, he even recently finished reading "A Tale of Love and Darkness". Suddenly the ability to avoid making life altering decisions is good for the facial skin. Also for the conscience. I ask him to raise one of the critical decisions he has made in the past years. He chooses the decision to take out the arch-terrorist Salach Schada with his wife. This decision was made in his first days in office. "On my behalf, the deliberation for such a long time was immoral. The longer he lived, the more Israelis were killed." Eventually 14 people other than Schada were killed, among them his wife and daughter. The reason: the missile hit the neighboring house, that was supposed to be empty according to intelligence reports. "Yes," he says, "there are things that don't let go."

Does that follow you today?

"I can't carry too much. But I'm not proud of it. It's not something to be proud of." His work as a researcher at the Shalem Center allows him to connect with the academic aspect of the conflict and still be close to the field. He believes the next outburst will be in the Gaza Strip. He agrees with COS Ashkenazi that there is no avoiding a ground attack because this situation cannot be ignored. "Gaza today is a little El-Qaedistan, a lot Hizbullistan. They are gathering capabilities that will ultimately reach Ashdod and Kiryat Gat and everything between them and the strip."

Is there any chance of the revival of suicide bombings?

"If they could – they would. What prevents them is the way we are deployed around the strip and the reality in Judea and Samarea where we are arresting terrorists in their beds. That's the key. Only then comes the wall."

But how realistic is the renewal of bombings?

"They try all the time. The motivation is there, the will is there, the ability to create improvised weapons is there. Without our constant action, every night since Homat Magen, they would be back blowing themselves up."

He has no doubt that Israel's security problem is the lack of willingness to recognize its right to exist as a Jewish country. This makes the territorial conflict an ideological one and complicates things much further. There is no talk of dividing the country or a co-existence. If the division was a serious option it could have taken place in 1937 (the Peel committee), in 1947 (Nov. 29th), or in 2000 (Camp David). "But there is a Palestinian leadership here, not only the Hamas, but Fatach too, that has not acknowledged our right to exist." Arafat's going to war in autumn 2000 reflected his will to avoid the permanent agreement based on two countries. "Since the dawn of Zionism, we have no partner here."

The rise of the Jihadist Islam has turned the conflict into a clash between civilizations. "This is actually part of the third world war that has already reached New York, London, and Bali, that challenges the entire Western civilization. The US is the big Satan, we are the small Satan."

What you are saying is that not much has happened since 1948.

"We are still fighting our war of independence."

Is this a cultural war too?

"They are a culture that sanctifies death. If you educate a three year old to wear a bomb belt, that's an opposition to our culture that sanctifies life."

Are you leading me to the conclusion that there is no hope for us here?

"There is. But for that, strategy must be established." That's what he's trying to do today. The prognosis is not closed yet, the work is currently focused on diagnosis. He has the terrible feeling we are deluding ourselves about the diagnosis. "We were living under the feeling that peace was soon to come. We would just give up territories, but a bit here, give up there, converge here, and get peace." In 1995, when he was Head of Intelligence, he began doubting that. When the second Intifada broke he became completely convinced. "We were self-delusional. We were arguing about the solution without agreeing on the problem. It was a closed circle of politicians who were creating short term hope in order to be elected."

Regardless, in spite of the painful awakening, what vision can you offer?

"It's a long term vision. We must understand that a large part of our cup is full. That our circumstances are much better than they were at the beginning of the 20th century. I would like to deal with the "no alternative" vision, because there is no alternative. Do I want to return to the reality of my grandfather who died in the Holocaust or my grandmother who survived it?" His contribution is currently focused on developing ideas that will eventually become strategy. "I am trying to create thoughts about vision," he defines. Are these searches for vision going to lead him into politics? Boogie is careful. He says he has never rejected it flat out. Anything like "never" could be irresponsible. For now, it is clear to him that he is feeling, examining, trying to locate the field in which he can contribute most, "I am still searching for my Archimedes point."

Back To Top

Print article